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1. Introduction    
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) (Landt, 2001) is a prevalent technology that replaces 
barcode technology and it will be massively applied in both consumer and commercial 
products as the trend predicts. However, the computation power and memory of RFID 
including the EPCGlobal Gen-1 and Gen-2 RFID tags are restricted. These made the 
implementation of well-known cryptographic algorithms, both computational and memory 
intensive, on the tags not possible.  
Although various cryptographic privacy enhancing technologies for RFID have been 
proposed, they include Hash-lock approaches, Digital Signature approaches, Encryption 
approaches, Time Stamping approaches, Pseudonyms approaches and Challenge-response 
approaches, the EPCGlobal tags continue to operate in a limited security protection. 
The Hash-lock approach (Weis, 2003) is based on locking the tag using a hash of the key on 
the tag, where the key is stored in a back-end server. This approach assumes that tags can 
not be operated securely in a long isolated environment. This approach can be used for 
authentication, by matching the right hash of key. The cloning resistance is weak and 
enhanced techniques providing better privacy protection and scalability have been derived 
(An, 2005; Nohara, 2005; Wang, 2007).   
Digital signatures approaches (Juels, 2003; Bono, 2005; de Dormale, 2005)  provide better 
tracing and forgery resistance of RFID during authentication process. The approaches use a 
PKI encryption technique to avoid static identifiers and information to be read by others. 
Authentication is performed by verifying data on the tag is signed using a valid public-key 
digital signature to check the valididty of authentication.  
Encryption approaches (Golle, 2004; Feldhofer, 2004; Ranasinghe, 2004; Ateniese, 2005) are 
similar to digital signature approaches except simplified private key standard or propriertay 
cryptographic algorithm is used.  
Time stamping approaches (Glidden, 2004; Molnar ,2005; Tsudik, 2006; Ith, 2007) are the 
most popular approaches which provide a dynamic matching of time information that help 
avoiding replay attacks.  
Pseudonyms approaches (Juels, 2004; Juel, 2006; Molnar, 2005; Avoine, 2005) is very similar 
to time stamping approaches except the dynamic information is scheduled from a pre-
defined list of pseudo-random data called pseudonynms.  
Challenge-response approaches (Ree , 2005; Dimitriou, 2006; Duc, 2006; Chien, 2007) are the 
most secured techniques developed from multi-pass authentication process to provide a 
wide range of security and privacy protection. O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 D
at
ab
as
e 
w
w
w
.in
te
ch
w
eb
.o
rg
Source: Development and Implementation of RFID Technology, Book edited by: Cristina TURCU,  
 ISBN 978-3-902613-54-7, pp. 554, February 2009, I-Tech, Vienna, Austria
www.intechopen.com
 Development and Implementation of RFID Technology 
 
318 
In actual situation, EPCGlogal Gen 1 (Garcia-Alfaro et al, 2008) tag implementation uses 
protocols that only require RFID readers to use the tags’ unique serial numbers to identify 
the tags. Tags with the same ID will certainly confuse the reader. Gen 2 rectifies this 
problem by allowing reader to read tags even if two or more tags have the exact IDs. The 
unique sequence of communication makes anti-collision algorithm more robust and reduce 
the possibility of interference from other tags when a reader is talking to a certain tag.  
In order to handle reading multiple tags reliably and securely, a number of security 
techniques have been deployed in Gen 2 (EPC, 2005; Roberti, 2005). They are Session 
Concept, Dense Readers Conditions, Enhanced Secured Protocols, Ghost Reads 
Improvements and Covered Coding. However, there are still some privacy concerns in both 
user and application levels left in the standards and a security loophole in defining and 
managing the key ‘random number’ that require attention in order to avoid possible privacy 
violation or information leakage by eavesdropping on the communication channels. 
1.1 Fake tag ID (ghost reads) problems 
Fake Tag ID (Ghost Reads) is the major reading problems with Gen 1 tag. Noise or glitches 
are a hurdle in adopting this valuable technology.  As confirmed by the report from RFID 
Alliance Lab (Deavours, 2005), the Class 0 ghost read rate is about 1.3 per 1,000. These ghost 
reads can create havoc in many solutions. Gen 2 protocol has an edge on that and it comes 
with a very vigilant solution to tackle this problem using a ‘Query’ Concept. The ‘Query 
Concept’ establishes a mutual authentication flow to allow secure exchange data and to 
eliminate fake tag ID problem. 
Strict timing constraints in Tag-Reader communications create an illusion of full duplex link. 
In fact, the communication is still operated in a half-duplex mode. Tag will not talk when it is 
listening to the reader commands but the timing constraints make sure that tag must response 
to reader command within a preset time. If the tag fails to response within the preset time, the 
task will be terminated and the entire process has to be started from beginning.  
1.2 Password protection and effective randomness 
A secure communication channel is essential for data transmitted over an air interface. In 
Gen 1 Class 1, an 8-bit password was used with a ‘kill’ command to safeguard the data. 
However, this 8 bit password is not secure and eases to break because of just 256 possible 
values. In Gen 1 Class 0, a 24-bit password is used which gives a better data protection 
against eavesdropping. Gen 2 with even better safeguard uses 32 bit password while 
offering 4 billion possible values and makes the brutally  search for the correct password 
difficult and thus provides a very high level of secure communication that EPC tags never 
had before (Roberti, 2005). 
To strengthen the password requirement in communications, a random number is used in 
Gen 2 to scramble the data commuted. Tags will generate and use a 16-bit pseudo-random 
number generator (PRNG) throughout the communication link session.  Because the PRNG 
is close to truly random, the communication link is ensured to be safe. For example, having 
a tag population of up to 10,000, the probability that any two or more tags simultaneously 
generate the same sequence of RN16s (16-bit random number) is less than 0.1%. The 32 bit 
password protection in Gen 2 is further enhanced by using “cover coding” while EXORING 
the data with random numbers to mess up the data (EPC, 2005) during transmission,  a 
matching random number is needed to recover the transmitted data at the receiver end.  
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1.3 Security problems and possible attacks 
With increasing mobility requirements, RFID readers are integrated in a handheld device or 
even in mobile phones. The low-cost tags are likely the factor for widespread adoption of 
the technology, deployment on such massive scale has created new threats to user and 
application privacy due to the powerful tracking capability of the tags (Luo et al, 2005). All 
UHF standards do provide a security mechanism for reading user memory but any reader 
can read the tag ID on fly. Security check must be imposed on the tag before transmitting 
the ID and a mechanism should be defined to recognize the trusted reader to address 
privacy concerns.  
The transmission protocol (EPC, 2005) defines the mechanism to exchange instructions and 
data between the reader and the tag, in both directions. It is based on the concept of 
"interrogator (reader) talks first" and it simply means that every tag compliant to UHF 
standards will always answer to reader’s query with its identification (ID) at very first hand. 
This makes the RFID technology susceptible and any intruder reader can track a tag.  The 
attacker can obtain concrete product information associated with EPC/UID code. This 
product information is usually provided in the public network. Although current UHF 
protocols have ‘kill’ command/option which makes tag presently dead and can be executed 
before moving the tag in the hands of end-users but it is not the solution for most 
applications. Some applications require permanent tag tracking, for example, tags associated 
with objects for security purposes, personal identification systems, vehicle tracking system 
etc.  
Another tag security issue relates to the scenario. Since the communication between a tag 
and a reader is by radio means, anyone can access the tag and obtain its output, i.e. attackers 
can eavesdrop on the communication channel between tags and readers, which is a cause of 
consumers’ apprehension. Therefore, the authentication scheme employed in RFID must be 
able to protect the data passing between the tag and the reader, i.e. the scheme itself should 
have some kind of encryption capability (EPC, 2005).  
Gen 2 provides a good mechanism for securing the data communication between the tag 
and reader. The exchange of cover-coding is first initiated by a random number request, i.e. 
RN16, from the tag. If a lower secured mechanism or plaintext only is used, eavesdrop on 
the communication channel will break the entire security process of the cover-coding. The 
generation and management of this ‘random number’ are vital for ensuring the security and 
integrity of the system but its size should be reconsidered and time of command to response 
should be restricted with precise values. So that, random number and time for command to 
response should be directly proportional. Although the random RN16 secures the 
communication link but its 16 bit size still makes it susceptible as generating or searching 
65536 combinations is very easy with ordinary processors. The duration of command to 
response time makes it more vulnerable which means that reader  A would start querying 
the tag but reader B (an intruder) can jump in the communication link with fake random 
numbers.  
1.4 Possible solutions  
Duc et al (Duc et al, 2006) proposed schemes for enhancing security of EPCglobal Gen-2 
RFID tag against Traceability and Cloning.  It enhances the weaknesses of Rhee (Rhee, 2005), 
Juels (Juels, 2006),  and Dimitriou (Dimitrios, 2006) schemes, which are either not conform to 
EPCGlogal standard or unable to resist the privacy or/and DoS attack.  
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Duc et al’s authentication relies on the synchronized session key between the tag, T, and the 
server, S, an adversary can initiate replay attack, man-in-the-middle attack and brute force 
attack that will cause DoS in the RFID system. If any one of the “end session” command was 
intercepted, the shared session key between T and S will be out of synchronization. As a 
result, T cannot be authenticated anymore.  Thus, Duc et al.’s protocol is not able to resist 
the DoS attack, and it does not provide forward secrecy to the RFID system. Chien (Chien, 
2007) provides an enhnacement to Duc’s approaches by introducing a pair of old (previous) 
and new Session Keys, and a pair of old and new random number to avoid DoS attack but it 
cannot resist Man-in-the-Middle attack caused by a spoofed reader. 
We start our discussion in Section 1 with a short introduction and Section 2 we present Duc 
et al’s scheme as an enhancement to both Juels’ and Dimittriou’s schemes, and we elaborate 
how Duc’s technique will fail. In Section 3, we will give a scenario of all possible threats in 
RFID environment. In Section 4, we will propose a new security protocol to close these 
security loopholes and the corresponding simulation results in Section 5.  The security 
analysis of the newly proposed scheme will be given in Section 6. We will conclude new 
security RFID solutions in Section 7. 
2. Duc et al’s scheme review 
Duc et al. proposed a communication scheme (Duc et al, 2006)  to protect user privacy for 
RFID system. The scheme based on a synchronous session key between tags and back-end 
database server to authenticate each other. This mutual authenticate scheme takes the 
advantages of the hash properties of CRC function and a PRNG that are supported by 
EPCglobal Class-1 Gen-2 tags. The underlying idea is by using the same PRNG with the 
same seed at both tag and back-end database to generate the same session key on both side. 
To prevent tag send static message before update of the session key, a random number is 
added in the authentication process. Data will be encrypted by performing logic operation  
⊕ with the session key before transmission. Session key will be updated after each 
successful authentication. The following paragraphs will briefly explain the protocol flow. 
2.1  Symbol notations 
T  - RFID Tag 
R  - RFID Reader 
S  - Backend Database Server 
r  - Pseudo-Random Number Generated by Tag’s PRNG 
CRC(:)  - CRC Function 
PRNG(:)  - PRNG Function 
Ki  - Session Key for ith Session 
A  - Adversary 
2.2 Initialization of tags and back-end database server 
Initially during the manufacturing time, the tag has assembled with its EPC and the 
necessary parameters for the PRNG. A random seed number for PRNG and PIN is chosen 
and then stored into both T’s memory and S entry corresponding to the matching EPC. This 
is very important that each EPC must exactly match with its PRNG seed number and PIN, 
otherwise the tag can not be authenticated by the back-end server. 
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2.3 Communication channel between R and S 
The scheme assumes that R is communicating with S in a secure channel, both R and S are 
able to perform standard cryptography authentication. S can send the EPC and data to R in 
an encrypted form. S can even depend on the privilege of R, to determent what kind of 
information can send to the reader. 
Protocol flow 
Figure 1 shows the protocol flow of Duc et al’s scheme. The flow is illustrated as below: 
Step 1. First of all, R sends a query request to T 
Step 2. T generates a nonce r and form the message M1T = CRC(EPC║r) ⊕ Ki  and C = 
CRC(M1T ⊕ r). CRC in M1T actually is acting like a hash function while in C is 
functioned as an error detection function. M1T, C and r will then be sent to R. 
Step 3. R forwards M1T , C and r to S.  
Step 4. For each tuples in S, it generates a message M1 in the same way as M1T in T until a 
match where M1T = M1 is found. If matched, T is successfully identified and 
authenticated. S forwards T’s information to R. If match failed, S will send a tag 
reject message to T via R. Information on T will be updated if R is authenticated to 
T with the generation of M2. S uses the matched tuple’s EPC, PIN and Ki to generate 
the message M2, where M2 = CRC(EPC║PIN║r) ⊕ Ki . Finally, S will send the 
corresponding object data and M2 to T via R. 
Step 5. T generates a message M2T to verify M2 from R. T uses its EPC, PIN, r and Ki to 
generate the message M2T same as M2. If M2T matches M2, data exchange is 
XORING data with the session key Ki to encrypt or decrypt. However, if M2T does 
not match M2 , R is rejected and the session ends immediately. When data exchange 
is completed, R sends an “end session” message to both S and T. Both S and T 
updates the session key where Ki +1= PRNG(Ki) and wait till a new session starts. 
3. Possible attacks and vulnerabilities on Duc et al.’s scheme 
Duc et al.’s protocol is not able to resist the DoS attack and it can not provide forward 
secrecy to the RFID system. Since this authentication reply on the synchronized session key 
between T and S, an adversary can initiate replay attack, man-in-the-middle attack and 
brute force attack and causes DoS in the RFID system. If any one of the “end session” 
command was intercepted, the shared session key between T and S will be out of 
synchronization. As a result, T can not be authenticated anymore. The above DoS attacks 
actually are based on this vulnerability, aiming at intercepting the delivery of the “end 
session” command sent from R to T. 
3.1 Replay attack  
An adversary can use a spoofed R to send a query request to tags, then record the replay 
messages M1T and nonce r from T. Recorded message will replay with a session started with 
an authorized R, finally S will update its session key while T’s session key will remain 
unchanged. As the session key is out of synchronization between T and S, therefore T can 
not be authenticated anymore. This is one of the high level threats to the RFID system, as the 
replay attack can perform on a large numbers of T at a time. 
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Fig. 1. Duc et al’s Protocol 
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3.2 Man-in-the-middle attack 
Man-in-the-middle attack is very similar to replay attack, an adversary acts like a hub to 
store and forward messages between R and T. However, an adversary will intercept the 
command “end session” from R to T, to make the session key out of synchronization. Man-
in-the-middle attack is a high level threat to the RFID system too, as it can also perform on a 
large numbers of tag at a time. 
3.3 Brute force attack 
Since tag-to-reader authentication relies on the correspondence between nonce r, EPC and 
session key. It is important to take note that, before the update of the session Ki  in a 
successful authentication, the session key will remain unchanged, while the EPC is always a 
constant. Therefore, the variance of M1T is basically determined by r. An adversary can take 
this property to initiate a brute force attack on the message M1T. A random message M is 
chosen, then an adversary can send along with different r in each session until a reply of M2 
from reader. As the length of r is 16 bits only, the maximum trial times for r in a particular 
M is only 65536. The probabilities that the random message finds a match in S is mainly 
depends on the number of tuples exist in S. This is a very dangerous attack to the whole 
system, as the message length of M1T is 16 bits only, an adversary can send all the 
combination of M1T and r to R, it only cost 232 trial times to match all the tuples exists in the 
database.  
3.4 Forward secrecy  
If the tag is compromised, an adversary can obtain the EPC, PIN, Ki . From the 
eavesdropped communication data, we can trace the past communication record between T 
and R by computing the respective M1T and M2 with the obtained parameters. For instance, 
an adversary can take M1T ⊕M2 from the past communication, that can eliminate the session 
key and remain only the CRC (EPC ⊕ r ) ⊕ CRC (EPC║PIN║r ). Then we may use the 
obtained parameter from T and generate with r to trace the past communication of T from 
the eavesdropped past communication data. 
4. Proposed new protocol 
With the understanding of the possible attacks and vulnerabilities in Duc et al.’s security 
scheme, a new security scheme that improves the security performance for RFID system is 
proposed. 
The major differences between the proposed scheme and Duc et al.’s scheme are the 
additional random number challenge from the reader, and the database will keep the old 
session key for each tag, update the access PIN after each successful authentication and 
acknowledgement of M2 from T. The flow of the proposed protocol is further explained 
below. 
The tag T was manufactured and assembled with its corresponding EPC with preset 
parameter for the pseudo random number generator PRNG. A random seed number for 
PRNG and PIN was chosen and was stored into both T’s memory and backend data server S 
with entry corresponding to the matching EPC. The database will store the session key Ki -1 
and PINi-1 after the first authentication. The communication between Reader R and server S  
was through a secure channel of which cryptographic algorithm can be used in 
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authentication and for the object data exchange. The protocol below can also provide 
secured communications between R and T even for an insecure wireless channel. 
4.1 Proposed protocol flow 
The protocol flow for proposed scheme is shown in Figure 2.  The protocol sequences are as 
follows.  
Step 1. R generates a 16-bit random number n by its Pseudo Random Number Generator 
(PRNG) and sends it together with Query Request message to T. 
Step 2. T generates a 16-bit random number r by its PRNG and the message M1T = CRC 
(EPC║n║r) ⊕ Ki and the error checksum code C = CRC (M1T ⊕ n ║ r) and sends M1T, 
C and r to R. [N.B. ⊕ is an exclusive OR function] 
Step 3. R checks C = CRC (M1T ⊕ n║r) and detects any transmission error in the channel 
and R forwards M1T, C , r and n to S if no error was found, otherwise, the tag is 
rejected. 
Step 4. S generates M1Ki = CRC (EPC║n║r) ⊕ Ki  and  M1K(i-1) = CRC (EPC║n║r) ⊕ Ki -1 for 
each tuples in S.  
Step 5. If no tuple matches for M1Ki = M1T or M1T = M1K(i-1), the tag is rejected. 
Step 6. If M1T = M1K(i-1), it reveals that the session key is out of synchronization. The 
following steps are then executed. 
       Out of Synchronization Flow: 
               Step 6.1 S generates M2=M2K(i-1) = CRC (EPC║PINi-1║n║r) ⊕ Ki -1 and sends it to  
                               T via R.  
               Step 6.2  S then informs R to send the “end session” command to T 
               Step 6.3 T updates its Ki and PINi after receiving the “end session” command, S  
                               continues to keep both Ki and PINi  and Ki -1 and PINi-1  unchanged. In this 
                               session, R will not perform any read and write operation to T . 
               Step 6.4 Finally, R will re-initiate a new session with T using an updated session key. 
Step 7. If the tuple is matched where M1T = M1Ki , S generates M2 = M2Ki = CRC (EPC║ 
PINi║n║r) ⊕Ki . S sends M2 and the associated object data to R.  R then forwards 
only M2 to T. 
Step 8. T verifies M2 by computing M2T = CRC (EPC║ PINi║n║r) ⊕ Ki, if M2T = M2, i.e. R is 
authenticated, reading and writing T’s memory is granted to R;  otherwise, the 
request from R is rejected.  
               (Note: Data exchange between T and R is encrypted and decrypted by exclusive OR 
               operation ⊕ with the session key Ki.) 
Step 9. When R has finished the reading and writing operation to T, R sends an “end 
session” command to both R and S to trigger the key update process. Both T and S 
will update Ki and PINi using Ki = PRNG(Ki -1) and PINi = PRNG(PINi-1). A session is 
completed at this stage. 
5. Simulation 
In order to find out the average appearing time of M1T for a given tag,  a simulation 
programme was built using VB.net and MySQL data base to test both Duc’s and our 
proposed protocols. The number of occurrences of M1T in each successful key update session 
was measured and used for comparison. The tests was based on 65,535 random entries 
using a PRNG satisfied Gen-2 requirements with a repeated period of 59,092. 
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Fig. 2. New Proprosed Protocol  
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5.1 Pseudo-random number generation 
There are four essential parameters for each tag which includes a 96-bit EPC, 32-bit PIN, 16-
bit Ki and PRNG’s parameters. EPC , PINi and seed for Ki are randomly chosen from a 
PRNG.  The random number should satisfy the  Gen-2 tag requirements. 
A popular class of PRNG, linear congruential generator in the form of Xi+1 = (aXi+c) mod m 
was selected; where a, c and m defined the PRNG parmeters, Xi was the seed. In our 
simulation, a = 61979, c = 0 and m = 59093 were used. A repeating period of 59092 was 
obtained and satisfied the requirement of Gen-2 tag. 
5.2 Protocol simulation programme 
Figure 3 shows the layout of the simulation programme layout. The main screen in the 
centre simulates the protocol flow. The grid view on the left simulates the population of 
tags, while the right hand side grid view simulatse tag’s information tuples maintained in 
the database. On the right hand corner, the programme performs simulation for M1T out of a 
given trial times before a successful session key update for a selected tag in the tag’s grid 
view. In order to find out how the CRC function affect the average appearing times out of a 
given trial, the programme can simulate the generation of M1T for both CRC-16-CCITT used 
in current Gen-2 tag and CRC-32. 
5.3 Duc et al’s protocol under man-in-the-middle-attack 
An adversary appears in between the tag and the reader, emulating a store and forward 
hubs. It forwards query request from the reader and then sends M1T , C , r to the reader 
received from tag, and forward M2 to tag like an ordinary authentication process. However, 
after the mutual authentication, it blocks the “end session” command send from reader. As a 
result, the tag can not be authenticated anymore. Since the tag remains its session key and 
PIN unchanged while back-end database server updates them with PRNG. The simulation 
programme shows the tag is rejected in the next authentication. This Man-In-The-Middle 
Attack simulation shows that the Duc et al’s proposed RFID protocol can collapse. 
5.4 Simulation on average appearing time M1T and effect of CRC 
A tag was randomly chosen to loop recursively to generate 65535 trials for M1T in the 
simulation programme. The main difference of M1T between the two protocols was the 
introduction of an additional random number challenge n generated from reader . 
The simulation found that M1T was equalled to TD =1.5148,  TM  =1.5312 and TM =1.5234 for 
Duc et al and for the new proposed schemes using n=16 bit and n=32 bit respectively, where 
TD  was the Average Appearing Time out of 65535 Trial for Duc et al.’s Protocol, and TM was 
the Average Appearing Time out of 65535 Trial for the Proposed Protocol. 
5.5 Simulation result analysis 
The simulation result reveals that the period of CRC output in M1T does not follow the 
period of r. Since r is the only changing parameters in the M1T throughout the trial,  
it is expected that TD should approximate equal to r’s period. The period of r is found  
to be 59092 time, therefore the average appearing times out of 65535 trial should be around 
1.1. However, TD is found to be around 1.5 which has a significant difference from r’s 
period. 
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Fig. 3. Protocol Simulation Programme 
The simulation results also show that TM and TD behaved the same and thus an addition of 
random number challenge will not reduce TM, although the combined number from n and r 
is found to have no repetition out of the 65535 trials. 
Further tests on the effect of  CRC length on TD and TM was conducted using 32-bit CRC, the 
results TD =1.000168 and TM =1.000015 were obtained using n=16 bit respectively. This 
concludes that CRC affects the behavior of M1T but not the n.  
Since both TD and TM have dropped from around 1.5 to around 1 by using 16-bit CRC and 
32-bit CRC. It can be concluded that the repetitive of PRNG is caused by the CRC bit size  
used. Since a 32-bit CRC is not available in the existing RFID standards, its vulernability 
against replay attack is weak and thus needs enhancement in the next/new generation tags. 
6. Security & complexity analysis 
6.1 Security analysis 
Table 1 provides a security performance comparison of the Duc et al and this proposed 
schemes related to tag anonymity, data privacy, mutual authentication, forward secrecy, key 
attack, DoS attack and replay attack.  
Tag Anonymity 
Tag will never emit static ID, a new random number is chosen from Reader and Tag in each 
session to ensure tag anonymity. 
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 Duc et al.’s Protocol Proposed Protocol 
Backend Server’s 
Complexity 
N O(CRC) 2 N O(CRC) 
Tag’s Complexity 2CRC + 2PRNG 3CRC + 3PRNG 
Reader’s Complexity Send, receive and forward Send, receive and forward + 
1PRNG 
Reader Authentication Yes Yes 
Tag Authentication Two Phrase Three Phrase 
Spoof Reader Attack No Yes 
Resist to Dos Attack No Yes 
Resist to Replay Attack No Yes 
M1T Collision in Database No Yes 
Forward Secrecy No Yes 
Table 1. Security and Complexity Comparison 
Where, N  is Number of tuples in Back-End Database Server 
              O(CRC) is the Computational complexity of CRC algorithm. 
Data Privacy 
Tag never sends any plain text data through insecure channel, data is always encrypted by a 
session key with nonce. Reader can use cryptography algorithm to exchange data between 
back-end database server. Therefore, data privacy is protected. 
Mutual Authentication 
The new protocol performs both tag-to-reader and reader-to-tag authentication. Database 
authenticates the tag by verifying the message M1T. Tag verifies M2 generated by database. 
This mutual authentication scheme ensures data exchange will be granted to authenticated 
parties only. 
Forward Secrecy 
Even if the tag is compromised at some time later, as the PIN and session key is updated 
after each successful authentication, an adversary can not trace and track the compromised 
tag from the past eavesdropped communication data. Therefore, the forward secrecy is 
protected.  
Key Attack 
The shared secret session keys are chosen randomly for each tag and they are different from 
each other. Exposure for a single key will therefore not expose other’s tags secret information.  
DoS Attack 
The database will maintain six values including the old session key and old PIN for each 
tag. Even though the tag is out of synchronization with the database, it can still 
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communicate with the database, by performing a session key and PIN update process to 
synchronize with database. Although it may increase the communication cost, it can ensure 
that M1T will not subject to any replay attack.  
Replay Attack 
The random number challenge from the reader can effectively prevent replay attack from 
the spoofed tag. The generation of M1T has involved the random number from reader, 
therefore an adversary can not replay M1T from an eavesdropped communication between 
spoofed reader and tag.  
6.2 Complexity analysis 
The proposed security scheme complexity is studied according to its computation, storage 
requirement and authentication phrase.   
Computation Complexity 
To communicate with the tag, the reader requires only a PRNG and cryptography 
algorithm to authenticate to allow the transfer of data between reader and back-end 
database server. The requirements are feasible in the current generation reader. In the 
authentication process, reader actually acts like a store and forward hub between back-
end database server and the tag with the computation complexity are mainly handled by 
the back-end database server.   
The authentication between the tag and reader two CRCs and one PRNG to generate the 
message M1T.  The Reader authentication process requires one CRC and one XOR operation 
to verify M2. The key and PIN update process requires two PRNGs. A total of three CRCs 
and three PRNGs  being used in the whole authentication protocol.  
The database generates both M1Ki and M1Ki-1 for each tuple, so the computation complexity is 
equal to 2N (2CRC + PRNG), where N is number of tuples in database.   
Storage Requirement 
For the tag, it is required to store 3 parameter, i.e. EPC , PINi and Ki .  For the database, the 
storage requirement is the same as Duc’s scheme and it is required to store five values for 
each tag.  In addition, it requires to store the tag’s EPC, PINi, PINi-1 and PRNG’s seed for Ki, 
Ki -1.  
6.3 Authentication phrases 
The proposed security scheme is a three-phrase mutual authentication protocol.  
Phrase one:  Random number challenge from reader.  
Phrase Two:  Tag generates M1T to authenticate itself to reader.  
Phrase Three:  Back-end database server generates M2 which included tag’s access PIN to 
                               authenticate itself to tag, in order to grant the read and write right to  
                               reader. 
7. Conclusions 
In this chapter, we have evaluated Duc et al.’s security schemes under different attacks and 
pointed out its vulnerabilities, including DoS attacks, forward secrecy weakness and reader-
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to-tag authentication collision weakness. To overcomes these weaknesses, a new protocol is 
proposed. In our new proposed  scheme, it distributes the authentication computational 
complexity or loading to the back-end database server and the reader and keeping the 
complexity in the tag unchanged. The scheme also conform to existing EPCglobal Gen-2 
specification.  
The simulation results conclude that the average appearing time of M1T is affected by the 
CRC function but not only the random number input. This unwanted repetitiveness can be 
avoided by using a CRC-32 function instead, so hopefully it will be implemented in the next 
available generation of RFID tag in the near future. 
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